The Perils of Security Policy-Making in 21st Century

If I were to chose an epigraph for a book on the topic of challenges faced by security sector today, this quote from the recent book of Wilhelm Agrell and Gregory Treverton would say it all: ‘We are living in a social environment transcended by growing security and intelligence challenges, while at the same time the traditional narrow intelligence concept is becoming increasingly insufficient for coping with diffuse, complex, and transforming threats.’ [1] This post serves as an introduction to a series of episode studies/essays I am writing on security policy (employing, to extent possible, the knowledge from various social sciences), namely on the British Government’s strategies to counter the threats posed by militant Islamists. [2] This post briefly outlines the key themes I am interested in exploring and sharing the insights with the interested readers. [3]

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Four features, three themes

Security sector in the twenty-first century faces a number of unprecedented challenges, both by their scope and complexity. One set of contributing factors relates to globalisation. The nature and pace of technological advancements, and especially the revolution called Web 2.0, have exerted enormous influence on all aspects of life. Security environment being by definition dominated by uncertainty, nowadays becomes increasingly volatile—it is multifaceted, nuanced, filled with potentially large-impact surprises, and is very dynamic and rapidly changing. This makes planning, collecting and processing intelligence, and making decisions immensely difficult. On the top of it, militant Islam has evolved over the last three-and-half decades into a kind of security threat that the world has not encountered before; it keeps evolving through the mutually reinforcing relations between its political and religious causes and economic, political and social contexts as within certain countries, so regionally and globally. By the way things are developing it is clear that at present neither states nor societies are prepared to deal effectively with such a threat.

Western liberal democracies, in particular, are ill-prepared to counter modern extremism, due to certain limitations inherent to them as a governance system; moreover, they are showing reluctance to reform the established practices and procedures and to introduce more flexibility into security policy making. Societies, in turn, are undergoing a painful generational process which is characterised by declining trust towards governments but also deepening divisions between various social, cultural and religious communities. [*I am particularly interested in exploring social and cultural adaptation of migrants (and possibly newly arriving refugees) from the conflict-torn countries: (unmet) expectations, stereotypes on both sides (hosts and incomers), group identities – all this creates a fertile ground for misunderstanding, isolation, animosity, radicalisation, hate and violence.]

There have been various explanations offered in the literature, to democratic governments’ weakness in handling security sector issues. Four features of the present day decision making, which relate to the national security policy, deserve a close look. First is the sensitivity of issues dealt with by intelligence. Second feature is the urgency of the action required by citizens, from the state. These correlate and I will consider them in tandem, under the ‘pressing circumstances’ below. The third feature is an inherently political nature of the policy making, which in the case of security policy turns to be quite problematic (briefly addressed under the ‘political constraints’). And the fourth is the policy’s reactive rather than proactive positioning against the extremists, especially with regards to their very aggressive propaganda campaign (under ‘communication: a reactive stance’).

Under pressing circumstances

It is well known that in a daily life some people are ready to pay more for a quick gain instead of waiting a bit for getting it at a nominal cost. However, things change when we as individuals, communities, society feel endangered.  If there is a perceived threat to our lives and wellbeing or that of our beloved ones, we react sharply and our immediate gratification mood spirals with an enormous magnitude. At this moment of collective anxiety we are ready to overpay significantly (actually, no one even thinks about costs) and tend to put a massive pressure on the decision makers to act promptly and effectively.

The state’s reaction to public pressure in the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015 can serve as a textbook case: Initial shock gave place to the public outrage, then intensive media reporting took off and this followed by a panic that we were the next target of militant Islamists—all in all, for the officials finding themselves under huge pressure to make last minute amendments to the Strategic Defence and Intelligence Review, pledging significant additional human, technological and financial resources committed to the security strategy (additional investment of £2.5 billion and employment of 1,900 more staff) and then to hastily pass a decision on joining the airstrikes of the ISIL’s targets in Syria.

In this case, the Government’s actions did not seem rational but rather emotionally charged, under the intensity of public outrage. Such decisions tend to result in immediate gains at the expense of long-term priorities. They are also costly. A few days after the publication of the Defence Review and the reports on first airstrikes by RAF planes in Syria, there was no panic anymore. No one thought about the cost of the response.  Obviously, those funds will be taken from some other budgetary items, if not borrowed, and the society will bear the cost of it in the years to come. [*A post reflecting on the causes and consequences of this decision-making phenomenon, known as ‘availability cascade’, is forthcoming].

Political constraints

Key features of intelligence, such as fragmented knowledge and lack of timely and complete information, as well as difficulty gauging the progress make decision making in security sector notoriously complicated. The uncertainty of the environment where security policy operates partly explains one known weakness of democratic governments—that is, their indecisiveness in taking difficult decisions, also known as the ‘lack of political will’ to act on complex and sensitive problems. At the same time, there are situations when governments tend to act on security issues swiftly and with minimal hesitation. At least two political factors can be distinguished as contributing to this phenomenon.

Decision making in democracies is in many ways defined by electoral cycle, what limits politicians to implementing only those policies that can produce visible results in short time. Taking bold decisions is always difficult, as the cost of risk taking might be prohibitive, and hence, the time must be ripe. For example, the decision to launch the military campaign against al-Qaeda and their hosts, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, was only possible because of conducive environment created by September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the declaration of the ‘war on terror’. Similarly, the UK Government’s decision to join airstrikes in Syria was long on the agenda of the Prime Minister, but got the real chance to pass through the Parliament (without damaging his and the Conservative party’s image by the humiliation of possible defeat) in the aftermath of the Paris attacks, when the emotional tension was high and thus, conditions were favourable to overcome the opposition.

By its nature the policy making inevitably brings about change which affects the interests of various stakeholders. In foreign, defence and security policy domain, along with domestic interest groups (such as government ministries and agencies, and state and private contractors and providers of products and services) there are international (governmental, inter-governmental, international public and private) actors who have vested interests in the government taking this or another course of action under external obligations.

Government ministries/agencies elsewhere are constantly competing for funding, in a bid driven by the consideration of the scope and quality of work and, partly, by their political ambition to grow strong and exert more influence. For example, the Government’s reaction to Paris attacks, along with airstrikes, resulted in significant additional public funds pledged by the Prime Minister. This being a precedent, right after the terrorist attacks in Jakarta in January 2016, Scotland Yard went ahead announcing quite considerable increase in the number of trained marksmen (by more than 27 percent) in a move that cost £2.5 million of taxpayers’ money.

On the other hand, international allies put additional pressure on decision makers, either supporting or discouraging them, and not necessarily in the best interest of the nation but rather for the sake of the common good (NATO and European Union related policies stand as an example). Today, Syria and Iraq are not merely a battlefield where the war with ISIL, al-Qaeda, and other militants is fought. It is also the place where local actors (national governments vs. diverse opposition groups in Syria and Sunni tribes and former Baathists in Iraq), backed on either side by key regional players (Saudi Arabia vs. Iran) and global powers (US and allies vs. Russia)—all collide in their contestation over exerting larger influence in the Middle East theatre, in a dramatic, complicated geopolitical stand-off. Therefore, statements by some British pundits and politicians in justifying the airstrikes, that ‘we must show our solidarity with France’ or ‘we must go out there and prevent this threat from coming and hitting us next’ sound at the very least as naive (or misleading). Britain must join the fight because, first, that is what her allies demand of her; and two, that is the place to be, if you want to be regarded as an influential global player.

In their turn, the policy makers attempt at putting political pressure, or unduly intervening, in the intelligence process (which is there to provide an impartial specialist advice in support of the policy making).  This politicisation of intelligence may take various forms, from ‘soft’ framing to ‘hard’ manipulation of evidence and/or simply imposition of pre-formulated constructs, disregarding the intelligence advice. To these I would add another type, when policy makers simply reject the intelligence offered to them and rely on other information or their own reasoning. Given the degree of secrecy in decision making on the national security issues, we never actually know for sure how certain decisions were made and which type of politicisation was applied (if any at all).

Strategic communications: A reactive stance

The Government counter-terrorism strategy’s protective function is implemented by specialised forces quite effectively: the fact that there has been no successful attack by militant Islamists on the British soil in more than ten years stands as a proof. However, the responsive stance taken by the state enables militants dictate the pace, location and even the format of engagement. It is obvious when it comes to the terrorist propaganda: the state, the society, and the media are not doing well in countering it as could have been expected. This gives the Islamist extremists a possibility to manipulate individual perceptions and public opinion, media coverage, and eventually the decision making.

Aggressive propaganda undertaken by militants, first of all, targets the young Muslims and serves to justify violence. Traditional themes exploited are jihad (interpreted strictly as ‘just war’) and the protection of the Muslim lands from ‘infidel’ invaders. Their interpretation allows for pre-emptive attacks and killing civilians—to silence the critics among the Muslim community, of the methods they use. The propaganda also aims at glorification of the images of Islamist fighters (take, for example, Mohammed Emwazi aka ‘Jihadi John’), to promote the case of martyrdom and afterlife heaven. As for non-Muslims, through various video footages, particularly those with execution of hostages, militants intend at inflicting mayhem, so that to put additional pressure and diminish the resistance of targeted states/societies.

One of communication techniques used by militant Islamists is about imposing certain messages and symbols to influence the target audiences’ associations and perceptions. For example, the organisation which has its formal name as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, instead of being called by its acronym ISIL is frequently referred to in public discourse and in the official documents as Islamic State. No one seems to pay attention to this fact, but that is exactly what they want—to be seen as the state. And the attributes of the state, as known from classical definition, include an ‘exclusive authority to use violence for establishing law and order within its borders.’  [*A post is forthcoming, offering some insights into the terrorist propaganda and reflecting on the methods to counter it effectively.]

Consider this (for conclusion)

You have already noticed that I used the case of the British Government’s hastily taking decision on amending the strategy and joining the airstrikes over Syria, under different thematic parts of this post. In one part, the decisions are explained by the desire to calm down the public anxiety (‘availability cascade’), in another it suggests that the decisions might be the result of political manoeuvring of the Prime Minister, or the successful lobbying of political elites and military and intelligence agencies. It is also implied that this might have been the result of pressures from the allies, in the geopolitical struggle over the Middle East. All these explanations seem equally plausible, and I believe that more than one (if not all, to various degree though) have contributed to the decision in question. Think about it. And think about other similar instances (in any country) and their consequences. I will try to elaborate in the future posts, too. Especially from the point of what could be done to minimize the politicisation of intelligence and to increase the transparency and accountability in the defence and security policy domain.

 

[1] Wilhelm Argell and Gregory F. Treverton, National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 196

[2] There is no globally agreed terminology, but depending on the context (whether related to terrorism or to extremism) the most recent UK Government strategies and policy documents employ the ‘Islamist terrorism’ and ‘Islamist extremism’ phrases. I will use the ‘militant Islam’ alongside these two, as an overarching phrase. See: David Anderson Q.C., The Terrorism Acts 2014, Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006, September 2015; and Counter-Extremism Strategy, October 2015, Cm9148

[3] These posts aim at sharing opinion on certain themes and generating a cross-disciplinary discussion (ideally with the involvement of both practitioners and scholars), without pretending to present any comprehensive, all-encompassing analysis of the intelligence. I owe my understanding of the sector’s present-day developments and challenges to a number of excellent works produced recently by the leading authors in this field, such as: Loch K. Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007); Loch K. Johnson (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006); Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012); and Wilhelm Argell and Gregory F. Treverton, National Intelligence and Science: Beyond the Great Divide in Analysis and Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Continue reading

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Management Consultancy Firm in Post-2015 Era

 

This post represents a generic proposal written back in summer last year, and shared with a number of management consultancies which specialize in the international development assistance (with certain tailoring made in each case, to address the specific features of the recipient firm). The aim was to initiate a discussion on the future direction of management consultancy and to join forces in developing new approaches and products. I am posting it here because I am still interested in working on this. Of particular interest are the ideas related to programme/project design (such as modular designs) and evaluation (such as deliberative approach and simplified methods of conducting  RCTs and other experimental designs).

Summary

The purpose of this paper is to outline a strategic direction for management consultancy firms (especially those operating in the field of international development assistance) to strengthen their market position, financial standing, and client and partner relations. It recommends undertaking more aggressive marketing strategy—to position the firm stronger in the mainstream of international official aid and to go beyond aid working directly with public and private clients in developing countries—through developing and offering a set of new, innovative, technology based products and services; diversifying the development practice areas; and building networks and strategic partnerships for knowledge management.

Market trends

Development’s direct assistance is in transition. On the one hand, donors have announced quite an ambitious plan for the post-2015 development agenda, with financing rising ‘from billions to trillions.’ On the other hand, the share of official direct assistance (ODA) in the total receipts by developing countries (including ODA, other official and private financing) is declining and this trend is set to persist: some 28 developing countries, with a total population of 2 billion, won’t be ODA eligible by 2030.

Significance of non-traditional aid donors is increasing. This concerns both the level of financing and the new forms of cooperation they offer to developing countries. The contribution of non-OECD DAC countries to ODA has grown almost seven-fold in money terms, while its share in total ODA to developing countries increased from 1.8% in 2009 to 9.2% in 2013. Generally, private sources of international development financing—from philanthropy to FDI—would offer new forms of partnerships with the implementing partners, international and local consultancies and engineering companies.

Priorities—regional and by national income—are changing. Overall regional allocation priorities by donors are shifting towards middle income countries in Asia. In 2009-2013 ODA to Lower Middle Income Countries has grown more than eight-fold. In the same period, total allocation from all sources to the Far East Asia has more than doubled and its share in the grand total receipts by developing countries has increased from 13% to 22%. The current trend will persist, with two-thirds of Sub-Saharan Africa projected to receive less aid in 2017 than in 2014.

Shift from social to economic development. Although social sphere remains the biggest theme of bilateral donors’ ODA commitments in short term, economic development is getting more prominence in comparison with human development assistance. An increase in the number of goals from eight MDGs to 17 SDGs is partly a result of including economic growth and infrastructure themes. From 2009 to 2013, ODA allocations to Low Income Countries and Lower Middle Income Countries increased for economic infrastructure and services by half, while decreased for social infrastructure and services. Private investment in developing countries for the last decade has gone primarily to energy and telecommunications (combined 78%), while transport accounted for average 20%, and water & sanitation for 2%. This trend is observed in lending by the World Bank and regional development banks too.

Stakeholder analysis

Aid relations between donors and recipient countries are changing. Developing countries are becoming less dependent on aid as they are getting broader range of development assistance choices from diverse financial sources. The decreasing ability of donors to influence the recipient countries through aid is seen in the emphasis on the donor alignment with recipient policies (Paris Declaration 2005, Busan 2011). Increased South-South cooperation and the pragmatism it is built upon also contribute to the shift from aid conditionality to local ownership. For example, China’s African Policy (2006) is guided by four principles which are all about equality and mutual benefit.

Customer expectations point to innovative approaches. The spread of global value chains, the increasing importance of knowledge based capital, and rapid technological progress point to the emergence of a ‘new production revolution’ (OECD 2015). The capital share of developing countries in the internet economy is expected to increase to more than 50% by 2025. The recipients in developing countries are becoming more sophisticated in terms of technology, and therefore they require innovative solutions and new technology based goods and services. This means that international consultancies must draw on various forms of innovation, from new products to new marketing methods, organizational practices and external relations.

Competitors are investing in technology. A recent survey conducted by Accenture, among more than 2,000 business and technology executives across nine countries and 10 industries has revealed that 62% are investing in digital technologies, and 35% are comprehensively investing in digital as part of their overall business strategy. Being digital is no luxury anymore; this is about being competitive in 21st century.

Competitors enter strategic partnerships. While development consultancy can invest in R&D to extend its own technology base, it can also partner with firms having other specialisations to benefit from their knowledge. Networking—to initiate, maintain and utilize relationships with various external partners—is becoming crucial for business development. Management experts believe that the need to share knowledge will become so critical that in the future collaboration among networks of partner companies will become the defining mode of work.

Business development strategy

Dimension 1: Diversifying the practice areas. This can be achieved by strengthening the firm’s own pool of experts and building strategic partnerships for knowledge management with other firms. Practice areas may include: Social infrastructure and services (water & sanitation; education; health); Rural economic development  & environment (agriculture; natural resource management & disaster preparedness); Urban planning, private sector development (business enabling environment & regulatory reform; local economic development (LED); support to entrepreneurship, start-up businesses and MSMEs);  Economic growth and infrastructure (policy and regulatory reform; design and implementation assistance for industrialization, energy efficiency, telecommunications and transport programs and projects); Democratic governance (rule of law; anti-corruption; centre of government coordination and public administration horizontal systems; decentralization; citizen participation).

Dimension 2: Developing and selling digital products. The next generation goods and services are linked with the integrated digital platforms. The experience of digital businesses is relevant to international development: technology places the end user at the centre of interaction; digital business model focuses on selling results. The range of digital products may include: e-learning products (e.g. business studies course for entrepreneurs); e-resources (e.g. resource book and toolkit with templates for infrastructure projects, LED strategy development); public sector e-governance (e.g. geographic information systems (GIS), management information systems (MIS), M&E systems, trade portals & single window systems); apps with access to public sector information (e.g. geographic, economic & business, traffic & transport, meteorology & environment, legal system, social, natural resources).

Dimension 3: Offering digital services. New hardware and interface solutions are extending the possibilities of business interaction as in-house so with clients, while software intelligence allows businesses to achieve advanced levels of operational efficiency. This opens new horizons for remote management and service delivery. Technology based services of the firm to the clients in developing countries may include: e-marketing; customer networking; online advice, mentoring, coaching; financial technology; cyber security. Moreover, it allows working directly with recipients, public and private, offering them assistance in the development and implementation of ‘smart’ industrial policies, helping build technology base in recipient countries (e.g. technology labs, physical and virtual business incubators, business centres, and science & technology parks, innovation centres).

Dimension 4: Networking. Coordinating various internet based networks of customers and practitioners is considered as one powerful marketing tool and is increasingly used by international organisations and businesses. Topics may include:  Internet and technology policy (e.g. policy instruments to address such issues as shortage of technical skills, lack of housing for young specialists, supportive visa regime for talented migrants, flexible tax system); Business support infrastructure (e.g. how to run a successful business incubator, business centre, university-industry partnership); Financial infrastructure to support MSMEs and start-ups (e.g. micro credits, special loan and leasing schemes, credit guarantee facilities); Energy efficiency (e.g. policy instruments; power sector regulations; power sector integration, ownership & privatisation; resource mobilization). This dimension may also include setting regional hubs for training and networking activities (e.g. in Amman for Middle East & North Africa, in Nairobi for Sub-Saharan Africa, in Delhi for Central & South Asia, in Sydney for South-East Asia and Pacific, in Caracas for Latin America and the Caribbean, and in Warsaw for Eastern Europe).

The time needed to implement the change

The initial review, consultations and drafting normally takes about three months. The implementation may be long and difficult though, involving internal and external consultations, decisions by shareholders, planning, internal policy and organisational changes, resources, training, testing, marketing and design. Experience shows that it can take a year or more before the process begins to bear fruit, and as long as two to three years to complete the transition (in a mid-size organisation). Most challenging part of this endeavour is not in developing strategies and introducing new procedures, but making change in the organisational culture—this normally does not happen overnight and by itself, but takes years and demands continuous commitment of top executives, support from mid-managers, and encouragement, explanation and demonstration of benefits to stakeholders and the staff members.

July, 2015 Continue reading

Britain’s EU Referendum: Communication Insights (Part 4)

Part 4. The questions to be answered

So far, the battle over Britain’s future in the European Union has been taking place in shallow waters. Some of the reasons behind making the debate about such a momentous decision so irrelevant and misplaced were discussed in this paper. They include the priming of the referendum on the outcome of on-going renegotiation of Britain’s status and narrowly focusing the debate on two tactical options, instead of taking a comprehensive view of all the issues involved and seeing the outcome of the would-be referendum in a long term strategic perspective. There are also technical issues involved, such as those related to the quality, or usefulness, of information offered to citizens.*

Most importantly, it appears that the British society is not prepared to take the decision of such a life-changing magnitude yet.

European countries are struggling with numerous problems, trying to recover from the crisis that hit their economies so hard. At the same time, they are working to respond to a broad range of newly emerging political, security, economic, and social and cultural challenges. From increasing authority transfers to Brussels and concerns over  the ‘insufficient legitimacy of supranational institutions’ [1], to the unpopular austerity measures (which some activist from the left regard as the manifestation of ‘departure from the welfare state [2]) to the growing inequality (as between the EU economies, so within each given country), slower than expected (and indeed imperative) growth dynamics, high unemployment among the youth, to the cultural-identitarian concerns and failure of multiculturalism, to the rise of radical movements on both left and right—all this are legitimate concerns of Britons, as well as other Europeans, whether from the EU’s core or its periphery. Most of those problems are not unique to Britain, or to Europe as such—they are being witnessed across all the industrialised countries.

One group of questions is about how much of these problems can be attributed to the EU: What are causes of these problems and what are their effects? Where do they originate from? And to what extent the solutions are in the hands of the European institutions and how much is in hands of national governments?

Another group of questions is concerned with the reform: How the EU shall be reformed in order to be better suited to address the mounting and unprecedented problems of the twenty-first century? What is the role of Britain and other leading countries (such as Germany and France) in the reform process and, later on, in the reformed Europe? What kind of reforms to address Britain’s domestic problems the Government shall undertake on its own, within its sovereign responsibility? Is it possible to undertake two sets of reforms—domestic and common European—simultaneously and, above all, harmoniously?

These are not easy questions to answer, but these are the only relevant kind of questions to be posed and reflected upon. And if no one is ready to offer the answers today (what seems to be the case), then perhaps the best course of action would be not to rush with holding the referendum and instead to engage in a properly administered policy analysis deliberative process, in order to bring clarity and separate the wheat from the chaff. Such process shall normally involve two groups of audiences, where the communication is maintained as within each group’s members, so between the groups. One group comprises scientists, politicians and advocates [3] and another group is of citizen and institutional stakeholders.

This process requires a good organisation behind it. Considering vested interests of various groups and the enthusiasm with which both camps, and their affiliates and associated media outlets are going to convince citizens in the rightness of the choices promoted by them respectively—the role of impartial professional assistance to the constituency will be of paramount importance. And it sounds logical that this should be the Government’s responsibility to provide such an objective and balanced information by means of an ad hoc committee comprising the representatives of all parties and interested sides, along with independent policy analysts and subject matter and communication experts.

Interestingly, the findings of this process will help decide on the final set questions about the referendum itself: Does the referendum, as it has been set today and whatever its outcome, offers the solution? Does it serve the interests of citizens of the United Kingdom? Or is it a manifestation of political struggle of political and economic elites? For example, there has been an argument set forth by Andrew Glencross, that the ‘the simplicity and decisiveness that a referendum, particularly one that spurns the EU, promises is merely a mirage. … British political parties are presenting an in/out referendum as a simple solution to a complex problem. The reality is that direct democracy cannot resolve the Europe question – and nor should it: political and economic ties with the EU necessarily form part of an enduring British political conversation.’ [4]

Whether to hold the referendum in the end or to abolish the idea and to find some other mechanism/solution is a crucial decision, which can only be reasonably decided upon the policy deliberative process suggested herein. If the decision (as informed by various forums) is to run the referendum, then it would not be late to hold it, say, in March 2017 – still well within the timeline initially promised by the Prime Minister, when the citizens would be in good position to take their well-informed decisions on the United Kingdom’s future. It is important to remember that the real decision Britons will take is not about an immediate ‘leave or remain’ choice—it is about forward-looking ‘what and how’ strategic alternatives.

* Policy analysis issues will be addressed in a separate post.

[1] Edgar Grande and Swen Hutter, ‘Beyond authority transfer: explaining the politicisation of Europe,’ West European Politics, 39/1 (2016), pp. 23-43 at 23

[2] See, for example, Thomas Fazi, The Battle for Europe: How an Elite Hijacked a Continent and How We Can Take it Back (London: Pluto Press, 2014)

[3] According to James Throgmorton, these are the must-talk-to audiences in policy analysis process, see James A. Throgmorton, ‘The rhetorics of policy analysis,’ Policy Sciences, 24/2 (1991), pp. 153-179 at 174

[4] Andrew Glencross, ‘Why a British referendum on EU membership will not solve the Europe question’, International Affairs, 91/2 (2015), pp. 303-317 at 317